Legal Theory and the Variety of Legal Cultures by Leader, Sheldon
Journal of Civil Law Studies
Volume 3
Number 1 Civil Law Workshop
Saúl Litvinoff Series
Civil Law and Common Law: Cross Influences,
Contamination, and Permeability
Article 7
1-1-2010
Legal Theory and the Variety of Legal Cultures
Sheldon Leader
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls
Part of the Civil Law Commons
This Civil Law Workshop is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Sheldon Leader, Legal Theory and the Variety of Legal Cultures, 3 J. Civ. L. Stud. (2010)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol3/iss1/7
 
 
LEGAL THEORY  
AND THE VARIETY OF LEGAL CULTURES 
Sheldon Leader* 
 
I. The Two Anxieties .....................................................................99 
 
II. Cures........................................................................................100 
A. Positivism ............................................................................100 
B. Natural Law .........................................................................102 
C. An Intermediate Theory ......................................................103 
 
III. Dworkin’s Position ................................................................105 
A. Dworkin’s Argument ..........................................................106 
B. Critique ................................................................................108 
 
IV. Conclusion .............................................................................109 
 
 
This essay begins with a consideration of two anxieties about 
courts that are common to the civil and common law traditions:  a 
worry about illegitimate judicial law making, and a worry about 
judicial bias.  It will then move to the contribution legal theories 
might make in dealing with these shared anxieties, with a focus on 
a position that draws on the two largest contestants:  natural law 
and legal positivism.  It will end with an indication of the further 
distance that theory needs to take us before these worries about the 
judiciary can be effectively tackled. 
 
I. THE TWO ANXIETIES 
 
The civil and common law systems both raise a question that is 
well known.  How is it possible to combine the acknowledged fact 
that courts often make fresh law with the belief that the legislature 
is the site for law making with which democracies are most 
comfortable?  Courts create new law as frequently as they deliver 
answers to questions which codes, statute and/or previous judicial 
interpretations of a body of norms leave open.  How can the 
democratic suspicion of this law making capacity be given its 
proper place while acknowledging the undeniable fact of judicial 
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creativity that takes place every time a need to interpret the law is 
placed before the court?  
This dilemma accompanies the other one indicated at the 
beginning: how can one identify and cope with judicial bias?  The 
latter is more of a practical than a fundamental concern when we 
are dealing with straightforward corruption of the judicial office.  
But it becomes a more complex and elusive defect when we try to 
track down what can be called unintentional bias.  Here we need to 
tease apart legitimate moral and political convictions that judges 
must bring to bear on many open questions of law from those 
moral and political beliefs that, if allowed to sway judgement, we 
condemn as an abuse.  The hunt for judicial bias is, in its easier 
version, a hunt for bad faith: watching out for the judge who hides 
his or her moral and political objectives beneath a set of principles 
that appear to be neutral.  The more troublesome situation, 
however, arises when judges are of good faith.  The latter believe 
in all honesty that they are deploying a principle impartially as 
they reason towards a result, but an observer can spot the fact that 
despite good intentions the decision is deploying a principle that 
should not be brought to bear without, at the very least, being 
voted on by the people at large.1 
 
II. CURES 
 
A. Positivism  
 
One popular way of guiding people through these dilemmas is 
proposed by legal positivism.  This takes the view that moral and 
political impartiality within a legal system is achieved via relying 
on value free sources of law.  That is, if we have a stable and 
shareable way of seeing what the existing law is, whatever else 
separates us in moral and political belief, then this terrain can 
serve as a benchmark for seeing when judges have overstepped 
their limits by being unduly creative, and we can then also see 
when bias–albeit unintentional–has crept into what they are doing.  
What the existing law says at present, says the positivist, must be 
rigorously separated from considerations of what the law ought to 
be in the future.  
Given the anxieties that we are focused on here, it is useful to 
flag two variants of positivism that are relevant.  One can be called 
a two-stage model.  According to this, a properly functioning legal 
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system contains rules and principles giving guidance to judges 
enabling them to identify the existing law.  They must attend to 
this guidance, without bringing to bear any view about what they 
want law to be in the future.  That is a second stage activity, which 
must be rigorously separated from the first.  If a judge allows his 
forward looking preferences about what future law should look 
like to color his perception of what the existing law says, then he is 
doing a particular sort of damage: he is allowing his preferences to 
be smuggled into what looks on the surface like a description of 
the present law.  The losing party is then told that he has broken 
the law as it is, when in reality, says the positivist, he has broken 
the law that the judge would like to put in place–well after the 
action for which the defendant is brought before the court.  The 
loser is, in short, being retroactively punished.  
The work of HLA Hart tries to show us when this abuse 
happens.2  A rule of recognition, he argues, exists in all legal 
systems worthy of the name.  This rule reports the converging 
views of legal officials about where existing law is to be found: 
about how certain norms can be picked out from the forest of 
maxims, customs, and convictions we live by in society.  That 
which is identified in this way can be stably recognised as existing 
law–a candidate for application in a fresh case.  If it turns out that 
the candidature fails–that a new case is not clearly or satisfactorily 
covered by existing law–then the judge is, Hart argues, entitled to 
proceed to the next stage of adding to the body of law with a fresh 
decision.  
We are not told by this variety of positivism what the proper 
scope for judicial creativity is at that next stage.  Hart confines 
himself to the task of avoiding mystification: barring the judge 
from delivering a solution to what he pretends, or honestly but 
mistakenly believes, to be the existing law when he is actually 
shaping the law in the way he wants it to develop in the future.  
This positivist tries to offer a solution for the two anxieties with 
tools that yield clarity.  Once we are clear about the stage at which 
the judge is applying existing law and the stage at which he is 
making fresh law then at least we are able to engage, says the 
positivist, in a useful debate about the proper dimensions of the 
judge’s adventures at the second stage.  Without this protocol in 
hand, the positivist insists, we will not be able to reach that debate 
because the judge will not be able to see, at any point in time, 
when she has identified existing law and when she is 
unconsciously drawing on her vision of the future. 
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A second variant of legal positivism goes further, and does so 
in a way that is relevant for present purposes.  According to this 
species, the law enacted, particularly in the form of a code, is 
‘complete.’  This does not mean that the code is complete in the 
sense that it already contains all answers to the questions that it 
may be used to answer:  it is not a claim that the enacted law is 
normatively omniscient, containing already all answers to any 
possible questions put to it.  It is instead a different thesis:  that the 
enacted code already contains the answers to all open questions of 
law appropriate for courts to use as they apply the instrument.  If 
the answer is not to be found, and a solution is nevertheless 
needed, then legislative amendment of enacted law is appropriate, 
not a change in the law introduced by judge.  
This brand of legal positivism is therefore much more 
prescriptive about the role of courts than is the first.  Judges must 
confine themselves to looking for existing law to apply to fresh 
cases, and if the code or statute does not contain the answers, then 
for judicial purposes the matter is finished.  The code commands 
him or her to deliver a solution that reflects the fact that the 
plaintiff does not have the law on her side, and hence that the 
defendant cannot be made to suffer on the basis of a solution that 
the judge thinks would be the right one to offer.  If full justice is 
not achieved in such a case, because people like the defendant 
should, for moral reasons, be held accountable for what they did, 
then we are told that the solution is to be delivered at another time 
and in another place:  where the will of the people is registered.3  
Future defendants of this type can then be caught by fresh law, and 
if the people will a retroactive application of law to the defendant, 
making him guilty now for what he was not liable for back when 
he did what he did, then Hart tells us that we are at least remaining 
clear that this is what is happening.  
 
B. Natural Law 
 
Natural law proposes a quite distinct cure for the two anxieties 
we are focusing on.  However, it is important to start by noticing 
that the natural lawyer’s position takes as its point of departure a 
belief that is actually shared by positivists.  That is, natural 
lawyers start with a conviction that we must rigorously distinguish 
existing law from the law to be shaped by man in the future.  
Natural lawyers do this, as do the positivists, in order to prevent 
                                                                                                             
3. For a recent statement of this view, extending beyond codes to the 
interpretation of constitutions, see JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND 
DISAGREEMENT (2001) passim.  
2010] LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL CULTURES 103 
 
people from being punished by rules that pretend to be existing 
law, but falsely so.  Here, however, the means used to reach this 
objective are radically different.  The existing law, says the natural 
lawyer, is at certain crucial points quite separate from anything 
human beings can enact.  It is binding law, but is so because of the 
force of the values that all valid legal systems must embody, 
failing which they do not qualify as legal systems.4  
The difference between these two orientations–as bulwarks 
against undue judicial creativity and against judicial bias–is that 
the positivist will allow the judge to rely on a moral, political, or 
economic principle that might be highly divisive within the polity– 
and to do so under the mantle of applying the existing law–only if 
that principle has been imported into the legal system by a past 
legal event: constitutional enactment, legislation, or previous 
judicial decision.  If he cannot do that, then he will be changing 
the law as a judge–which the first but not the second species of 
positivist will allow.  The natural lawyer, by contrast, waits on no 
such past enactment of positive law: a judge might bring to bear a 
moral principle that is strongly controversial within a particular 
polity, but if he can show this principle to flow from natural 
morality rather than a contingently existing positive moral code, he 
will not be altering but rather giving effect to existing law.   
 
C. An Intermediate Theory 
 
Both positivism and natural law carry their own frustrations 
when trying to work with them in order to respond to our two 
anxieties about courts.  A general treatment of those shortcomings 
is not relevant here.  It is, however, possible to draw on both of 
these traditions, and via this synthesis to find a different way of 
responding to the two concerns.  The first point to notice in 
building an alternative strategy is that it is necessary to jettison the 
positivist injunction to the judge to confine herself to a source that 
will itself provide the appropriate values that apply in a given case.  
It is possible to rely on sources, but it is an illusion to think that 
these stand in front of the judge ready for inspection, independent 
of her views about what the law should be.  The reason is that 
what counts as a source of law is itself the product of deploying 
moral values.  For example, the judge might accept the injunction 
to ‘follow precedent’ in a common law system, but this injunction 
does not tell him whether to opt for recent developments in 
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collateral areas of the law, or to give priority to the direct line of 
cases that deal with the subject matter at hand.  Doing the latter 
might yield one result in a case, while doing the former might lead 
to the opposite result.5  In the civil law tradition, deciding what the 
Code ‘says’ is a product of first deciding on the weight to give to 
e.g. the enactor’s intentions, developments in later social 
conditions, etc. 
We also need to revisit the claim that a piece of enacted law 
can be complete.  If this means that the judge is not to draw on 
values lying outside of those that have already been enacted, then 
again this does not look adequate.  It is a variant of the positivist 
mistake about sources.  The completeness thesis claims that a 
divisive moral, political, or economic principle may well be part of 
the existing law, but only if they are first enacted into the system 
by an authoritative step taken by the legislature, in the form of, 
say, a code.  That simply reproduces the view that what counts as 
part of the code can be identified in a value free way.  If it is true 
that there is no way of construing a source, such as legal precedent 
without deciding, in the light of moral  or political principle, what 
scope and weight to give to different branches of precedent, then 
the assignment of that scope and weight must come from values 
that lie outside of any given set of precedents.  The same point 
applies to a code.  A code cannot generate from within itself the 
values that will guide those interpreting it when they must decide 
what weight to give to each of its features.  If it tries to do this–by 
giving a schedule of answers to all questions about its proper mode 
of interpretation–there must be a prior commitment of the 
interpreter to accept this protocol as binding: that is itself a 
commitment that must come from outside of the code itself.  
This is not just a dry point of conceptual housekeeping.  It can 
color judicial attitudes of deference to any given code.  Why 
should any particular judge accept the injunction to stay within the 
values already announced in the code, and to rely on legislative 
amendment of that code if she is not happy with what she finds?  
Why should she not take it on herself to supply what she is 
convinced is missing, and would make the code better?  Courts are 
often willing and indeed should override the letter and spirit of any 
single piece of enacted law in order to achieve a larger coherence, 
as well as a result that corresponds to the best normative position 
that the judiciary can in good faith deploy.  
 This last point is central to one of the better-known 
theorists occupying this intermediate position, Ronald Dworkin.  
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Dworkin’s view is particularly worth exploring–both for its merits 
and its shortcomings–as helping to see what common and civil law 
traditions can do to cope with the two anxieties about judicial 
power.  
 
III. DWORKIN’S POSITION 
 
When a judge reaches an answer to open question of law, he or 
she is properly confined to ‘finding’ appropriate answers within 
the existing law, argues Dworkin.  But this not same sense of 
‘finding’ an answer as is deployed by the natural lawyer, nor by 
the species of positivist who believes that the enacted law is 
complete in the sense identified above.  
Some initial definitions will help here in order to pin down 
what is meant by judges finding rather than creating law: 
Settled law: This is a collection of valid statements of law, as 
in the report that a given system provides 1, protection against 
unwarranted use of trade secrets; 2, against publication of an 
author’s work without his or her consent; 3, against circulation of 
photographic images of someone; and finally 4, that it provides a 
general right to privacy.6  These examples divide into two types: 
explicit and implicit propositions.  Imagine that the explicit 
propositions are 1 through 3, but not 4.  
The first three statements are true because of enactment by an 
authoritative source:  judges in previous cases, legislation, or an 
enacted code.  The statement that there is a right to privacy within 
the settled law, by way of contrast, is not true because of any 
specific enactment.  It is instead a right that has emerged over 
time.  It stands to the explicitly enacted rights as a genus stands in 
relation to distinct species.  The latter have enough in common to 
allow them to be grouped together into a generic class.  The genus 
contains elements that enable us to understand each of the separate 
species more comprehensively and effectively than is possible if 
each species is grasped separately.  Thus, Warren and Brandeis 
offered their famous demonstration that the right to privacy 
formed part of the existing law by showing that it emerged from 
the more narrowly defined range of explicit rights in the set made 
up inter alia of rights 1 through 3.  To posit the existence of the 
right to privacy allowed them to understand and to justify a range 
of explicit rights, even if it is not formally announced by the courts 
or legislature or constitution.  
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Implicit propositions of law are built up out of earlier legal 
events, which enact the more narrowly defined norms in the 
system.  These implicit elements allow us to link a range of 
differently grounded answers to past questions of law and also to 
provide a generic category or principle under which a fresh case 
can be subsumed.7 
Finding and making law by judges:  Judges can make law in 
the course of their decisions in one of two ways:  they might add to 
the explicit elements in the system, adding, for example, an 
extension or a narrowing to the coverage or a given rule.  This 
happens frequently and routinely.  Or, they might add to the body 
of implicit propositions within the system.  This is very rare, but 
can and does happen.  
Judges can find law in two corresponding senses: they might 
find an existing explicit norm; or they might ‘find’ an implicit 
norm.  In doing the latter a judge may conclude that while there is 
no explicit law governing a new situation, there is implicit law 
governing it because the generic principles that make most sense 
of the previous explicit norms lead coherently to this situation 
being covered as well.  It should be noted that when a judge finds 
the law in this second sense he or she is constructing a rationale 
for previous explicit norms post hoc: that is, a fresh and more 
comprehensive principle is substituted for the one which in fact 
grounded the particular, more narrowly grounded norm.  
 
A. Dworkin’s Argument  
 
A way of rendering Dworkin’s position is to say that judges 
may add to the body of explicit law, but in doing so they should 
stay faithful to the body of implicit law.  Within this constraint, the 
judge is entitled to extend the coverage of implicit law on grounds 
of coherence.  If, for example, he or she can unify the solutions 
from past enacted law under the mantle of a right to privacy, then 
even if not expressed that way before and even if earlier law was 
actually grounded on different principles, the law is properly 
extended in this way.  
How do a judge’s moral convictions fit into this picture?  If the 
building up of an implicit part of the law was simply a matter of 
reporting what explicit law says, and then of reporting the areas in 
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which distinct branches of that law overlap such that the new 
implicit principle is a notional lowest common denominator, then 
there is no room for moral judgement.  It is a matter of description, 
however complex that description might be.  But this misconstrues 
the demands of this approach.  In constructing a plausible implicit 
part of the law, there are various ways in which the construction 
can happen.  If we go back to the right to privacy, the area of 
overlap between the explicit parts of the law identified by Warren 
and Brandeis converges on the proposition that one has, as they 
put it, a “right to be left alone.”  But there is a good deal more that 
has to be decided about the nature of the entitlement to be left 
alone before it can function as an implicit part of the system.  We 
have to know if it is a right that can be overridden relatively easily 
by, say, an employer who wants to tap telephones because he 
wants to know if personnel have critical attitudes toward 
management that could make a difference to corporate 
performance, or if he can only legitimately tap those telephones if 
he reasonably suspects some graver harm, such as employee 
frauds.  In other words, decisions have to be made about the 
character of the right:  about its relative weight against competing 
rights; about the character of the interests it is best suited to 
protect; about its availability against interference by private as 
well as public bodies; etc. 
These characterising decisions are themselves moral and 
political.  They are not dictated by the character of separate parts 
of explicit law, and cannot be extracted by seeing where those 
separate simply overlap.  Moral values have to be brought to bear.  
They are choices that cannot flatly contradict the values that 
explicit law is grounded on, but they can fill out those values in 
ways that are unexpected by the authors of past legislation, 
constitutions, or legal decisions.  They must, as Dworkin puts it, 
‘fit.’8 
This intermediate position, and the form it takes in Dworkin’s 
theory, would easily find himself in the shoes of the civilian jurist 
as depicted by Julio Cueto-Rua, “...every case should be 
considered as an example of a class; the class, species of genus; 
the genus as a species of another genus of a hither degree of 
generality; and so on until very general and basic concepts are 
finally defined.”9  
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B. Critique 
 
How well has intermediate theoretical position responded to 
the two anxieties that our systems share:  the concern to place 
limits on judicial law making, and the concern to achieve moral 
and political impartiality?  Insofar as Civil Law holds to belief in 
the completeness of Codes in the form examined–a preference for 
legislative amendment over judicial development of the law–then 
this is a constraint that Dworkin would be likely to reject.  So, it 
seems, would many civilians.  But how far are they willing to go 
in Dworkin’s direction?  The ideal judge for Dworkin legitimately 
reaches across all elements of enacted law, all codes and all case 
law, to achieve harmony between them.  The guardian of the 
keystone principles, on this approach, should be the judiciary.  
This seems to complement Cueto-Rua’s argument that the civilian 
approach leads the system to keep pushing for coherence across 
domains of law “...until very general and basic concepts are finally 
defined.”  Such coherence is not, and cannot be, in the ultimate 
control of legislatures.  
Such a conclusion might raise difficulties about democracy in 
a particular way.  Concerns about the undemocratic nature of 
judicial power arise from two related directions.  One has to do 
with the problem of majority rule and minority rights, asking how 
far it is legitimate to frustrate the former in order to protect the 
latter.  Linked to this, however, is another less well publicised 
problem that is relevant to the issues dealt with in this essay:  what 
weight is to be given to an understanding of law as an expression 
of will and law as an instantiation of principle?  
To rely on the will of the people when interpreting the law is to 
accept that ‘this is the law because they want it this way and the 
fact that they have expressed their preference deserves respect.’  
To rely on principle is to reach for results that are due respect not 
because the fit with the wishes of a particular body, but because 
good convincing reasons, independent of those wishes, can be 
given to show that this solution is defensible.  Dworkin is inclined 
to allow principle to have a dominant role in the polity.  
That dominant role makes sense when we are dealing with 
single fundamental values, and asking about their coherent 
extension.  It is more of a problem when we have to assign 
priorities to–or otherwise combine–competing values, all prima 
facie fundamental and each backed with competing fundamental 
rights.  Here, the relevant considerations unfold in more complex 
ways.  Courts are best placed to deal with these competing rights 
when the exercise of one will have a very damaging effect on one 
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and will make a marginal impact on the other.  For example, 
exercising ones right to free speech under an opponent’s bedroom 
window seems intuitively to call for an adjustment of the former in 
order to do less damage to the latter.   
However, there are some situations where both of the right 
holders can have their backs to the wall:  one or the other must 
win, leaving the loser with little room for an alternative way of 
exercising their right.  The winner takes all.  The parties find 
themselves in this situation if, for example, a small business is in 
financial crisis, and has to work on Sundays:  can it legitimately 
require its employees to work those days when their church 
explicitly requires Sunday attendance?  Can an employee be put in 
this position when he or she does not have a realistic prospect of 
finding an alternative job?  If someone’s only prospect of proving 
her partner’s violence is to adduce private correspondence in court, 
should the right to privacy give way to the right to bodily safety?  
If a doctor has to choose between killing one of two Siamese twins 
or letting both die, how should he proceed?  
Here it may be that the clash of values is close enough that we 
need a decision that is respected just because it has been rendered 
in good faith, and not because we happen to be convinced by the 
strength of the principles adduced in support of it.  It may be too 
close a call for the latter approach.  Of course, these clashes may 
first surface in front of a court, and the court must do its best to 
decide given the urgency of the situation.  But it would be better if 
the priorities between basic rights here could be guided at least by 
principles given to us by other law making organs:  organs such as 
legislatures where law as an expression of will finds a greater 
place.  Ultimate clashes of value, such as here, should better be 
proactively dealt with–wherever realistic to do so–by legislatures.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The civil and common law systems share worries about 
judicial power and seem to entertain similar solutions to those 
worries.  Each is legitimately frustrated by the proposals that 
natural law or legal positivism offer.  Both can potentially make 
use of the intermediate theory sketched here.  Civilian and 
common lawyers, in their daily work, put a challenge to that 
theory:  they force it to answer the large questions about the 
division of powers between judiciary and legislature via the more 
narrow and detailed questions that arise when basic rights compete 
with one another in concrete cases.  The common need to get these 
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answers right overshadows anything that might separate the two 
systems.   
 
